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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OIF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEARA ANN DEVEREAUX,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
a corporation, and HAROLD J.
McKEEVER,
Defendants arnd Respondents.

Case No.
8472

Brief of Respondent

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The preliminary statement as contained in the brief
of appellant is accurate and acceptable to respondent.
Also, the statement of the case is reasonably accurate, and, in the interest of expediency, we will not
attempt to repeat such statement but shall only call the
1
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attention of this Court to certain additional facts of
serious import.
The locale of the accident involved was Highway
U.S. 91, which is the primary highway between Salt Lake
City and Provo, Utah. (Par. III of Plaintiff's complaint.)
The highway is of multiple lanes (See Ex. 1, 2, 3, 4) and
is heavily traveled (R. 20). There is no intersection at
this place and the accident occurred within a range of 75
feet to 100 feet (R. 14) of the crest of a hill. The slope
of the hill was downward to the north. There was no
visibility from the place of impact over the crest (R. 14).
At the time of commencing her "U" turn plaintiff
testified that she looked in both directions but that she
saw no car that was close and that she ne-\er saw the
vehicle that was being driven northward and stopped by
the witness Breeze (R. 62 and 85), although this witness
stopped for Officer Allred and \\as stopped in the center
lane as plaintiff commenced her '' U'' turn. Plaintiff, at
time of impact, was in the lane of travel "hich was the
second lane to the east from the center of the highway
(R. 31 and 41-42).
Plaintiff in her statement of facts takes due care to
explain the use of an alcoholic be\erage by defendant
McKeever. It should be carefully noted that intoxication
'vas not an issue in the case submitted to the jury nor
has any appeal been taken from the failure to submit any
such issue. We can only construe this is an attempt to
influence this Court on a non-existent issue and irrelevant
matter as far as this appeal is concerned.
2
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Therefore, it is nec.essary that this Court consider
the foregoing discussion of facts in conjunction with
those set forth ·by appellant.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED HER RIGHT
TO A JURY TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES.
POINT II
IT IS ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS EVIDENCE INTRODUCED WHICH WOULD SUPPORT
A FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT IN THE OPERATION OF THE AUTOMOBILE
AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY
CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.
Plaintiff, in this appeal, argues two matters that are
not germain to the issues raised by the appeal, namely,
(a) the sufficiency of the evidence of plaintiff to establish the negligence of defendant; and (b) an alleged
error of the trial court in giving instruction No. 5, as
argued by plaintiff commencing at page 16 of the brief.
The order granting the motion of defendant for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was upon the ground
of contributory negligence of plaintiff, as preserved and
argued by defendant in his motion to dismiss at the conclusion of plaintiff's case, and in the motion for directed
verdict at the conclusion of the entire case, both of which
motions were taken under advisement by the trial court.
(R. 182, 192 and 195.) For the purposes of those motions
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3

and the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
the sufficiency of the evidence to establish negligence of
defendant was assumed. It was just a question as to
whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Why
plaintiff on this appeal argues a matter with reference
tp which there is no longer an issue in the case is not
understandable, unless plaintiff hopes thereby to draw
a red herring across the path of this court to divert its
attention from the real issue, namely, the conduct of
plaintiff in making a '' U'' turn across a busy highway
just over the brow of a. hill where the view of oncoming
traffic was limited to a distance too short within which
to stop.
Plaintiff made no motion for new trial on the ground
of its alleged error in giving Instruction No. 5; the correctness of the instruction was not before the trial court
upon the motion of defendant for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and is not now before this court
for review. This is another red herring and has no place
in the appeal.
POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED
DEFEN.DANTS' MOTION SETTING ASIDE THE
VERDICT OF THE JURY .A.ND ENTERING JUDGMENrr FOR THE DEFENDANTS, NO CAUSE OF
ACTION.
As hereinbefore indicated, the sole issue on this
appeal is the determination of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff as a matter of law. A review of the
decisions of this Court leave little doubt as to the pro4
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priety ·of the ruling of the trial court.
Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 Pac. 2d 777.
This case has been cited and construed on several occasions with approval. This decision involved a defendant
who was makjng a left turn c~lliding plaintiff's vehicle
approaching from the opposite direction. This Court,
through Jus tic~ Wade, stated :

"Section 57-7-133, U.C.A. 1943, provides: '(a)
No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course
upon a highway unless and until such movement
can be made with reasonable safety * * :J(•.' Defendant turned his car from a direct course· in the
highway into the lane of traffic intended for
vehicles traveling in the opposite direction at a
time when plaintiff's car was approaching in such
close proximity that the collision occurred as soon
as the front end of defendant's car had reached
a few feet into plaintiff's lane of traffic. Had
plaintiff's car run into the rear end of defendant's
car after the front end thereof had entirely crossed
plaintiff's course of travel, there might have been
some question whether the turn could he maqe
with reasonable safety, but under the facts in this
case it is clear that as a matter of law the turn
could not be made with reasonable safety, and the
. defendant was guilty of negligence. The defendant's testimony that he looked and did not see any
car coming .does not help his situation, because
if he had paid attention to what was there to be
seen he would have seen plaintiff's car coming,
as it was approaching in the immediate vicinity,
and there is no claim that it did not have proper
lights. It is equally clear that such negligence of
the defendant was at least one of the proximate
causes of the accident. The accident was the immediate and direct result of this negligence, and

5
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without such negligence it would not have occurred.
''So under these circumstances plaintiff could
not have avoided the accident, and defendant's
negligence was as a matter of law the sole proximate cause of the collision and resulting injury
and the court erred in not so instructing the jury.''
The decision not only held that the maneuvers of
the defendant were negligent as a matter of law but further held as a matter of law that such negligence was the
sole proximate cause of the collision.
The Cederloff case, supra, was followed by the case
of Hart v. Kerr, 110 Utah 479, 175 Pac. 2d 475, which
again was a case where a motorist was turning to the
left side of a highway when an accident occurred. Again,
through Justice Pratt this Court stated:
''There seems to be rather an obvious conclusion at which to arrive from the evidence. Plaintiff knew defendant was coming fast (he testified
40 miles per hour) ; and plaintiff's automobile
was hit in front of its center-the conclusion:
Plaintiff took a chance upon a faulty estimate of
distances and speed and lost. Considering the
duty imposed upon plaintiff by section 57-7-133
U.C.A., 1943, he clearlv was at fault. We invite
attention to our recent decision of Cederloff v.
Whited, Utah, 169 Pac. 2d ·777, ,,~here this section
is discussed. In this case as in that the contact
between the cars was such as to indicate that one
party was too close at the speed he "~as going for
the other to attempt a crossing. We are of the
opinion that the principles of the Cederloff case
are decisive of this case. The lower court properly
directed a verdict of no cause of action.''
6
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See also Yeates v. Budge, ______ Utah ______ , 252 Pac. 2d
220 and French v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 117 Utah 406,
216 Pac. 2d 1002.

Graham v. Roderick, 32 Wash. 2d 427, 202 Pac. 2d
253, involved a collision when plaintiff was making a
'' U'' turn in an intersection and that court in holding
plaintiff negligent as a matter of law said:
''A 'U' turn movement, executed at an intersection within a city, is at best a more or less
hazardous operation, often requiring considerable
skill and vigilance to be safely executed, because
of the fact that the operator engaged in such
maneuver must observe and contend with traffic
approaching from four directions.
"While both of the respondents in this instance testified that they looked to their left before
proceeding into the cross-traffic of the arterial
highway, they did not see appellant's automobile
approaching, although it was there to be seen, nor
did they stop before proceeding across the arterial.
''Respondents' principal contention and reason
why they did not stop for, and give the right of
way to, appellant's vehicle is that its lights could
not have been burning, since they looked and saw
none. The trial court made no finding that appellant's lights were not burning, although it did
observe, in its memorandum opinion, that the
lights 'may have been dim either from battery
weakness or on low beam or on dimmers.' We can
agree that such may have been the case, but, as
appellant has pointed out, there is no evidence in
the record to support any such theory.
"Because of this fact, we are left with a situation where the only rule which can be applied is
7
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that a party will be deemed to have obse_r~ed that
which he necessarily would have seen If he had
looked and will not he absolved of the charge of
'
.
negligently
having failed to look, by testrmony
that he looked and did not see. Paddock: v~ Tone,
25 Wn. (2d) 940, 172 P. (2d) 481; Stanley v. Allen,
27 Wn. (2d) 770, 180 P. (2d) 90. ''

Latndfair v. Capital Transit Co., 165 Fed. 2d 255, involved a "U" turn. by plaintiff. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for Washington, D. C. used the
following language in sustaining a directed verdict for
the defendant.:
"The facts giving -rise to the suit follow. In
the early .evening of August 19, 1944, appellant
was driving an automobile south on the west side
of Fourteenth Street, in the Northwest section of
the District of Columbia, and attempted a 'U'
turn at a point north of Arkansas Avenue. This
street is fifty feet wide, and traversing its center
are two sets of streetcar tracks, one for northbound and the other for southbound traffic. Each
set of tracks is four feet and eight inches wide
with a 'dummy' space between of five feet and
two inches. Appellant testified that she was travel~
ing at a slow rate of speed, that she looked to the
south for oncoming traffic. and sa'v none, that she
made the appropriate signal for her turn to following traffic, and then carefully attempted a 'U'
turn and her automobile was struck broadside by
a streetcar as she crossed the northbound tracks.
She gave explicit testimony that her view to the
south in the direction of the on-coming streetcar
was sufficien tl ~,. good to a.llo"r her to see clearly
as far as Shepherd Street, three blocks to the
south of the point where the collision occurred.
Appellant further testified that she looked to the
south and saw no oncoming vehicles as late as that
8
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time when she was crossing the 'dummy' space
between the car tracks, not more than five feet
from .the point of impact.
''The fact of the collision produces the inevitable conclusion that appellant must have seen the
oncoming streetcar if she actually looked in its
direction. Northern Pacific R. Co. v~ Freeman,
174 U. S. 379, 19 Sup. Ct. 763, 43 L. Ed. 1014;
Miller v. Union Pa.r~ific R. Co., 290 U. S. 227, 54
Sup. Ct. 172, 78 L. Ed. 285. The duty to look cannot be questioned. Chicago R. I. & P. Railrod Co.
v. Houston., 95 U.S. 697, 24 L. Ed. 542. Under comparable circumstances this court has previously
rejected such testimony as that given by the appellant, declaring contributory negligence on the
part of the injured person as a matter of law.
Glaria v. Washington Southern R. Co., 30 App.
D. C. 559; Faucett v. Bergmann, et al.,. 57 App. D.
C. 290, 22 F. 2d 718. These rules apply where the
plaintiff's case is based upon an allegation of last
clear chance. W ashin.gton Ry. & Electric Co. v.
Buscher, 54 App. D. C. 353, 298 F. 675."
The principles involved were again repeated in the
case of Capital Transit Company v. Hedin, 222 Fed. 2d
41, as follows :
"We conclude that under Maryland's statute
and judicial decisions, it was Hedin's duty to yield
the right of way to the bus approaching· on Ager
Road, not only at the entrance to that highway,
not only at the entrance to the second or northbound roadway, but also throughout his passage
across the second roadway on which the bus was
traveling. He cannot avoid this duty by saying
he looked and did not see the bus. And the excessive speed he attributes to the· bus, which he did
not see, does not in the circumstances of this case
excuse him for driving into its path. There was
9
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no evidence upon which the last clear. ch~nce doctrine could have been applied. The District Court
erred in denying appellant's motions. Upon remand, the verdict and judgment thereon should
be set aside and judgment should be entered for
the defendant.''
Applying the standards of care and principles of
law that are discussed in the foregoing authorities, it is
clear that the plaintiff in this case was negligent as a
matter of law and that such negligence proximately
contributed to the collision if not the sole proximate
cause by reason of definite undisputed facts as shown by
this record.
In an attempt to explain away the fact that plaintiff failed to see that which was apparent and obvious,
the idea of ''distribution of attention'' is injected under
the authority of Martin v. Stevens, ______ Utah ______ , 243 P.
2d 747. That case involved giving some attention to multiple streets in an intersection. Here there is no sueh
excuse. At the commencement of plaintiff's "U" turn
her only consideration could have been in regard to th~
northbound traffic up to the time of impact "~hich occurred in the easternmost lane for traffic traveling
north. In this respect, this Court has already spoken
on the subject in the case of Smith v. Bennett, 1 Utah 2d
224, 265 Par. 2d 401. That case involved a pedestrian
plaintiff ,,~ho was struck "~hile crossing the traffic lanes
for eastbound traffic. In regard to the demands on
plaintiff's attention the following language is used:
"Plaintiff cites a series of cases illustrated by
l\1artin v. SteYens, Utah, 243 P. 2d 747 ~ Lowder
v. Holley, Utah, 233 P. 2d 350 ~ Poulsen v. ~{anSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ness, Utah, 241 P. 2d 152, in which the questions
of contributory negligence and proximate cause
were held to be jury questions. A major dissimilarity exists between the facts of the case now
before the court and plaintiff's authorities. In
these cases we were concerned with situations
such as intersectional accidents where the plaintiff's attention was demanded in more than one
direction or in more than one place. Since his
attention could not be in all places and in all directions at once, it was a question of human judgment
as to how his attention should be distributed
among the several competing demands. A question of fact for the jury was presented as to
whether his distribution of attention was reasonable. In the instant case there was but one demand
upon plaintiff's attention. There is no room for a
reasonable difference of opinion as to where her
attention should have been concentrated; it was
incumbent upon her to observe the condition of
approaching traffic. That she failed to use due
care in doing so is manifest from the evidence.''
The Smith case cites with approval, and all to the
same effect, Mingus v. Olsen, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac. 2d
495; Sant v. Miller, 115 Utah 559, 206 Pac. 2d 719; and
Cox v. Thompson, ______ Utah ______ , 254 Pac. 2d 1047. It is
undisputed in this case (as a matter of fact, it was presented in plaintiff's case) that at the time plaintiff
started her '' U'' turn that the Breeze vehicle was stopped
at that very place (R. 67, 68), and plaintiff did not see
it (R. 108, 119) nor did she see the car of defendant
McKeever (R. 108, 119). This is exactly the principle
discussed in the foregoing authorities.
Appellant's brief discusses the activities of Officer
Allred and Sec. 41-6-63, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and
]]
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it is most interesting. The Code provision requires a
motorist to comply ,with a lawful order of a police officer.
The conversatiQn and . arrangements were neither an
order nor a lawful order and no exigency nor emergency
existed. See West v. Cruz, 75 Ariz. 13, 251 Pac. 2d 311,
and Falasco v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 224, 44 Pac. 2d 469.
Certainly, nothing of this sort could be apparent to the
defendant McKeever, (R. 6, 16, 17, 18, 24). At the time
of the collision Allred was way over on the west side of
U.S. 91 facing and traveling south (R. 41). Nothing wa·s
stated in word or acts that would relieve plaintiff from
exercising due care. Quite the contrary, plaintiff was
warned by Officer Allred when he stated, "Now, let's
be careful. ' ' ( R. 47.) In no better language could plaintiff have been warned of the danger and hazards of the
turn she attempted. Of course, the officer's judgment
was lacking . He could have directed plaintiff to a safe
and lawful place where the turn might have been made.
It appears. upon a fair examination of this record
that plaintiff's maneuver violated the provisions of Sec.
41-6-67 and Sec. 41-6-69, .Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
and that such violations constitute negligence as a matter
of law in addition to her lack of due care as previously
discussed.
It seems unnecessary to argue the element of proximate cause., In all of the foregoing authorities this ele·
ment was under consideration. Not only ''yas the improper '' U'' turn unanimously regarded as the proximate
cause of the collision but in this case as in Gederlof v.
Wh~ited, supra, it could properly be regarded as the sole

12
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proximate cause.
Each and every authority cited by respondent is
analagous, in point, and determinative of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
This Court stated in Walker v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d
54, 278 Pac. 2d 291, that "in all cases of collision, both
drivers are required to exercise that degree of care
which a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances would exercise for his own and others' safety,
and where the failure of a party to meet this standard
is a contributing cause of the accident, no relief can be
had on his behalf." (Italics added.) The facts of this
collision and accident clearly and without doubt show
that plaintiff woefully failed to meet the standard of
care as required by the statutes of this State and the
pronouncements of this Court.
Respondent submits that the judgment as it was
finally entered by the trial court was the only proper
judgment that could be so entered pursuant to law as it
has been consistently determined by this Court.
Therefore, we respectfully urge tha~ this Court sustain and affirm the action of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM
Attorneys for Defendants
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